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LEGISLATIVELY DIRECTED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE MEANING OF 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
Matthew R. Kipp* 
Paul B. Lewis** 
With the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), Congress attempted to 
further a trend that the federal judiciary had undertaken largely 
on its own initiative. Sensing a critical need to address the mount-
ing expense and delay of federal civil litigation, Congress, like the 
judiciary, sought to increase the degree of early and active involve-
ment of judges in the adjudicatory process. The result of this 
mandate has been a further emphasis on the role of the judge as 
a case manager. As a necessary corollary, the liberty and self-
determination of individual litigants-ideals that have historically 
been seen as philosophical cornerstones of the Anglo-American 
adjudicative process-have been correspondingly diminished. In 
this Article, the authors examine the departure from the philo-
sophical moorings of the Anglo-American system of justice that 
implementation of the CJRA represents and consider whether the 
gains to be achieved by the Act, if successful, offset the potential 
costs to the litigants that the Act imposes. 
Ajudge is more than a moderator; he is cha.rged to see that 
the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he 
cannot discharge by remaining inert.1 
You can't be a rationalist in an irrational world. It isn't 
rational. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA or Act)3 arose 
from a reform movement that had been building for several 
* B.A. 1985, Yale University; J.D. 1989, Columbia University. Associate, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. Mr. Kipp was a member of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. 
** B.A 1986, Northwestern University; J.D. 1989, Yale University. 
1. United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.). 
2. JOE ORTON, WHAT THE BUTLER SAW 72, act 2 (Grove Press 1970) (1969). 
3. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is Title I of the Judicial Improvements 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 
(Supp. V 1993)). 
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years. Long before Senator Joseph Biden introduced a bill to 
reform the nation's civil justice system,4 judges and commenta-
tors alike had noted the sharp increase in cases filed in the 
federal courts, the growing backlog of unresolved cases caused 
by this increase, and the corresponding escalation in cost and 
delay attendant with litigating a case in the federal system.5 
As a result of such trends, judges of their own accord increas-
ingly had become involved in the management of pretrial 
litigation.6 
The Civil Justice Reform Act was a legislative attempt to 
coordinate and encourage various judicial methods to stream-
line federal litigation. The Act was based on the proposition 
that the cost and delay of federal civil litigation had grown to 
the level where access to, and use of, the nation's courts was 
jeopardized for all but the wealthiest members of our society.7 
The central purpose of the Act was to assure continuing, 
meaningful access to the federal courts by reducing both the 
time and cost associated with litigating a case at the federal 
4. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. 
5. See, e.g., Anthony v. Abbott Lab., 106 F.R.D. 461, 465 (D.R.I. 1985) ("Our 
citizens' access to justice ... is under serious siege. Obtaining justice in this modern 
era costs too much .... °tlf our courts] are to remain strong and viable, they cannot 
sit idly by in the face of attempts to loot the system."); Francis E. McGovern, Toward 
a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 443 
(1986) ("Despite some evidence which shows that a dramatic reduction in case dura-
tion may offset increases in the filing rate, there is a general perception of judicial 
system overload."). 
6. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE US., Civn. JUS'TICE REFoRM ACT REl'oRT 4· 
(1994) [hereinafter CJRA REPORT] ("Prior to the CJRA many courts had established, 
either by local rule or general order, various principles and techniques contained in 
the statute."); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New 
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981) (discuss-
ing the use of pretrial management procedures for effective handling of the increasing 
number of cases, especially complex and protracted cases); Charles R. Richey, Rule 
16: A Survey and Some Considerations for the Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 600 
(1989) (discussing a variety of judicial case management techniques); Alvin B. Rubin, 
The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving the Just, 
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. 
J. 135, 138-45 (1978) (listing seven advantages of judicial responsibility for case 
control and discussing pragmatic ways to implement such procedures). 
7. See S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6809 ("For the middle class of this country ... the courthouse 
door is rapidly being slammed shut. Access to the courts, once available to everyone, 
has become for middle-class Americans a luxury that only others can afford.") 
(citation omitted). 
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level.8 The Act proposed to do so largely through "improve[d) 
litigation management" by the judge assigned to the case.9 
This mandate was far froni nominal. Although many judges 
prior to the Act already had employed a variety of "manage-
rial" techniques, this legislative directive represented a formal 
recognition that the more traditional, passive role of the 
judge-a role that was a primary value in the Anglo-American 
system of justice-was no longer viable under present-day 
conditions. Shortly after the Act's passage, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist acknowledged this transformation of the role of the 
federal judge: 
This traditional view of district judges has changed some-
what in recent years. Huge case loads have led to more 
emphasis on case management andjudicial administration, 
and the recent Civil Justice Reform Act will accelerate this 
trend. District judges have lost some of their discretion to 
handle their own dockets and now must both view them-
selves as managers and experience some of the strong 
hand of management themselves. 10 
The CJRA is therefore significant for the philosophical 
transformation that it signifies. Passage of the Act illustrates 
the insight of Joe Orton's aphorism: 11 the concept of the pas-
sive, reactive judge is no longer "rational" in the "irrational" 
world of burgeoning case loads, swelling backlogs, and ex-
tended pretrial procedures. Rather, Judge Learned Hand's 
articulation of the judge as an active case manager, as opposed 
to an inert moderator,12 appears now to be the only "rational" 
alternative.13 
8. See id. at 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804 ("The purpose of this 
legislation is to promote for all citizens-rich or poor, individual or corporation, 
plaintiff or defendant-the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes 
in our Nation's Federal courts."). 
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. V 1993). The Act sought to achieve uniform 
systemic change in an odd manner: each of the ninety-four federal judicial districts 
was empowered to bring forth and experiment with its own individual expense and 
delay reduction plan. Id. 
10. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future 
of the Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 8. 
11. ORTON, supra note 2, at 72. 
12. United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.). 
13. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171 (1989) ("One of 
the most significant insights that skilled trial judges have gained in recent years is 
the wisdom and necessity for early judicial intervention in the management of litiga-
tion."). 
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At root, the Act marks a philosophical departure from the 
basic notions of individual autonomy and self-determination, 
notions upon which the government of the United States, and 
in particular, the federal judicial process, has historically been 
based. 14 The idea of a judiciary designed primarily to serve the 
needs of the individual, a judiciary that correspondingly placed 
the individual litigants at the core of the adjudicative process, 
has a firm basis in Anglo-American jurisprudence.15 Histori-
cally, the belief in autonomy, dignity, and primacy of the 
individual has suggested that state or societal interests must 
necessarily be secondary to the interests of the individual in 
the adjudicative process. As such, and as will be. discussed 
more fully below, individuals traditionally have preserved 
their autonomy when invoking the civil judicial apparatus, not 
only by determining when to access the judicial process provid-
ed by the state, but also by retaining control over all relevant 
aspects of this process leading up to the final adjudication of 
the dispute. 16 
While there has been a growing trend toward procedural 
judicial activism in this country for the past twenty to thirty 
years, perhaps made most apparent by the advent of the so-
14. This change in some sense mirrors Bruce Ackerman's concept of "Constitu-
tional Moments," which occur when significant constitutional determinations that 
result in lasting changes to the fabric of constitutional interpretation are made, 
although, at the time these moments occurred, it was not self-evident that they would 
be of enduring significance. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ Constitutional 
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 486 (1989) (discussing "political movements [that] have 
mobilized popular consent to new constitutional solutions"); cf. United States v. 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1657 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Not every epochal case 
has come in epochal trappings."). The CJRA signifies not so much a "constitutional 
moment" as it does an official legislative acceptance of a series of such judicially 
implemented moments, as well as a furtherance of the changes suggested by these 
moments. 
15. Historically, the notion of adjudication in this country has been predicated 
on the idea that social and economic arrangements were based on the actions of 
autonomous individuals and were not actively imposed upon society by the govern-
ment. The civil justice system in this country was designed with this approach in 
mind. See infra Part I.B. 
16. As a practical matter, of course, this assertion cannot be wholly true. Certain 
procedural rules are imposed upon the parties to aid the judiciary in the adminis-
tration of justice, and the parties are obliged to comply with these rules. These rules 
should be, and generally are, nonsubstantive and content-neutral under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, to enable the judiciary to hear cases and administer 
justice efficiently, the Federal Rules set parameters on party conduct, and the parties 
forfeit some of their individual autonomy when they opt to invoke the judicial 
process. Although such forfeiture results in an increase in actual individual autonomy 
by allowing the judicial apparatus to function, it creates the appearance of a net loss 
of some individual autonomy. See infra Part II. 
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called public law model of judicial administration,17 the CJRA 
is a significant legislative acknowledgment that such activism 
is needed to address the increasingly complex problems of 
judicial management. 18 Through the Act's provisions, Congress 
not only placed its stamp of approval upon active court in-
volvement in areas of adjudication that traditionally have been 
the exclusive realm of the parties, but also deemed such 
judicial intervention to be a necessary part of modern federal 
civil litigation. 19 By doing so, Congress implicitly recognized 
that a curtailment of individual procedural rights was neces-
sary to effect a net increase in individual substantive liberty. 
That is, while the CJRA demands the reduction of certain 
adjudicatory values long considered primary elements of 
common law litigation, it does so based on the theory that 
such limitations are necessary to allow better access to a more 
meaningful system of justice. 
· The purpose of this Article is to discuss some significant 
implications of the CJRA. Part I puts the theoretical assump-
tions of the Act in context by considering two different models 
for the administration and resolution of civil disputes: (1) the 
passive judiciary model stemming from the political philosophy 
of, among others, Locke and Blackstone, and (2) the activist 
model, which is pervasive in continental Europe. Using these 
two models as opposing reference points, Part II examines the 
movement in America from one model of judicial involvement, 
the judge as umpire, toward another, the judge as case man-· 
ager. Part III considers the role of the CJRA in this move-
ment. After tracing the relevant background of the CJRA, Part 
III then outlines the implementation of the Act and delineates 
the principles of civil justice administration on which the Act 
rests. It discusses the contributions that the Act has made, 
and will likely make, in furthering the movement toward a 
17. Id. 
18. The legislature, of course, has approved amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but these amendments were drafted by the judiciary pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 961 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The CJRA, on the other hand, was a legislative effort 
from start to finish. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the 
powers conferred by the Rules Enabling Act and the mandates of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 
77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992). 
19. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 5, at 442 ("Underlying trends in litigation 
management and alternative dispute resolution are radical shifts in theories of the 
relative functions of judges and attorneys .... The new model of the judge's role 
suggests that dispute resolution shouid not be left largely to attorneys and parties. n). 
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more procedurally active judiciary. Finally, Part III examines 
the Act's expanded procedural limitations on litigants in ad-
vancing the role of the judge as case manager, and questions 
whether the Act will increase the real degree of autonomy and 
liberty for individuals by furthering the ability of individuals 
to avail themselves more fruitfully of the federal adjudicative 
process. 
I. Two METHODS OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE 
The Civil Justice Reform Act is the foremost manifestation 
of a national movement toward more active judicial manage-
ment of federal litigation. This movement signals a departure 
from the traditional concept of adjudication in the Anglo-
American tradition. Historically,judges have been passive and 
neutral. Their role has been to provide a forum for individuals 
-who have long been the dominant players in the adjudica-
tive process-to bring about an acceptable resolution to their 
disputes in a civil fashion. A well-established philosophical 
tradition supports this view of the judiciary. 
A. The Passive Versus the Active 
Administration of Justice 
At the extremes, there are two quite different models by 
which a state can administer justice. At one end of the con-
tinuum is a judiciary that is truly passive, which serves 
merely to provide a forum in which adversarial parties resolve 
conflict. In such a state, individual autonomy and self-realiza-
tion are the primary values, and individual rights are held 
absolute. Law serves only as a suggested approach to arrang-
ing individual relationships, and it is easily displaced if the 
parties agree to be governed by other rules of conduct. The 
American system of adjudication historically has reflected this 
fundamental notion; in many ways, however, the provisions of 
the CJRA run contrary to this antecedent of our judicial system.20 
20. See Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976). As will be discussed, there is a recent history 
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At the other end of the continuum is the activist state, 
where the judiciary itself, often due to its own interest in the 
proceeding, is an active player in the administration of justice. 
Such a structure of judicial administration is frequently called 
"inquisitorial," and under such a system political values tend 
to be imposed upon the judicial process.21 The inquisitorial 
system evolved primarily in continental Europe, and some 
version of it now dominates the judicial systems in most parts 
of the world.22 
B. The Philosophical Foundations of the 
American Judicial System 
1. The Passive, Reactive State-Dispute resolution in the 
United States traditionally has followed the model of the pas-
sive state. The role of the· judge has been that of neutral, 
passive decision maker whose tribunal exists solely to allow 
autonomous individuals to vindicate their rights under law.23 
of civil justice that comports with the philosophical tenor of the CJRA, and which per-
haps served as a springboard to the codification of the Act. For example, revisions to 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over the past 20 years have increased 
the activist role of the judge. See, e.g., Richey, supra note 6, at 603 (noting that "in 
Rule 16 the drafters endorsed-if not by mandating aggressive judicial involvement, 
then by at least expressly permitting such involvement-the managerial model of 
judging"). In addition, several scholars have considered the advent of "managerial 
judges" in the United States, particularly with reference to public law litigation, to 
be a step toward a more inquisitorial system. See, e.g., Chayes, supra, at 1296-98 
(discussing the heightened role of the judge in fact-finding in public law litigation); 
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 376-80 (1982) (discussing 
the increased role that judges play in all stages oflitigation). For a further discussion 
of this trend and other activist trends in the American administration of justice, see 
infra Part II. 
21. See Mn!JAN R DAMASK.\, THE FACF.8 OF JUSTICE AND STATE AtmIORI'lY 82 (1986) 
("Rather than emanating from civil society and mirroring its practice, activist law 
springs from the state and expresses its policies. The controlling image oflaw is that 
of the state decree, wholly divorced from contractarian notions."). 
22. See generally ARTHUR ENGELMANN ET AL, A HlsToRY OF CONTINENTAL CML PRoCE-
DURE (Robert W. Miller trans., 1927) (discussing the development of civil procedure 
in the individual countries of continental Europe). 
23. See Hubert L. Will, Judicial Responsibility for the Disposition of Litigation, 
75 F.R.D. 89, 117, 121 (1976) ("Judges for centuries have thought that they were just 
supposed to be skilled referees who would step into the ring when the lawyer combat-
ants said they were ready to fight .... When a case came to trial, how it was devel-
oped before trial, whether there had been adequate preparation for trial, whether the 
case had to be tried at all, none of these things were of concern to the judge."); Roscoe 
Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 347 (1905) ("[T)he 
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Judges do not serve to implement policy; rather, they serve 
primarily to provide a mechanism for social self-management. 
Legal procedure is thus designed in a policy-neutral way.24 
Judges do not take a dominant role in the judicial process. 
Instead, the litigants have traditionally been left to control 
this process: litigants may initiate an action by filing a law-
suit,25 join26 or intervene27 in lawsuits, and control the fact-
finding process.28 Procedural rules designed by the state to 
govern the dispute are generally waiveable on party consent. 29 
If such a party-dominated system results in less than an opti-
mal view of the truth, the truth must be subordinated to the 
necessity of protecting these individual rights.30 With the 
common-law theory of litigation is that of a fair fist fight, ... with a court to see fair 
play and prevent interference .... We strive in every way to restrain the trial judge 
and to insure the individual litigants a fair fight, unhampered by mere considerations 
of justice.n); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Euolution of the Aduersary 
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1989) ("The adversary system is characterized ... by 
a passive decisionmaker who merely listens to both sides and renders a decision 
based on what she has heard.n). As Professor Judith Resnik has noted, even typical 
artistic renderings portray "justice" as even-handed and neutral. Resnik, supra note 
20, at 382-83. 
24. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfound-
ed Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantiue Rules ofCiuil Proce-
dure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074-87 (1989). This notion of substance-neutral 
procedure, however, has been much challenged in regard to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which have often been criticized as incorporating value judgments into 
facially-neutral rules. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discouery Vices and Trans-
Substantiue Virtues in the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 
2246-47 (1989) (arguing that despite their facial neutrality, the Federal Rules have 
been used to facilitate "social justice litigationn); see also McGovern, supra note 5, at 
450 ("[P]rocedures are rarely value-neutral, whether or not we believe that they 
should be. Any procedure-regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute or the 
method by which procedures are applied-will affect the outcome of a case."). For an 
extensive critique of the impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Sympo-
sium, The 50th Anniuersary of the Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989). 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (a litigant invokes a civil action "by filing a complaint with 
the court"). 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
28. The trial judge historically had little or no power over either the fact-finding 
process or the organization of the adjudicative process. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 
20, at 1286; Marvin E. Frankel, The Aduersary Judge, 54 TEX. L. REv. 465, 468 
(1976). 
29. See, e.g., DAMA$KA, supra note 21, at 99-100. In the American system of 
justice, however, the abi.ity to waive a right is not always absolute. Cf., e.g., Singer 
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965) (discussing a criminal defendant's right 
to waive trial by jury, and holding that "[t)he ability to waive a constitutional right 
does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right"). 
30. Such a view is evident in the realm of criminal procedure. The "truth" often 
is placed second to maintaining certain individual rights, such as the right to avoid 
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passage of the CJRA, Congress has moved the adjudicative 
process in the United States away from this traditional model 
of party-dominated justice.31 
2. The Influence of Locke-The passive model of adju-
dication dates back in Anglo-American thought at least as far 
as Locke and Blackstone. Indeed, the fundamental importance 
of Locke's natural law philosophy stems from his use of natu-
ral law concepts to validate individual rights as primary in 
civil society. Notably, in The Second Treatise of Government, 
Locke's earlier notions of natural law are transformed from a 
universalistic concept to one that emphasizes the natural 
rights of individuals in relation to the state.32 That is, the 
right of individuals to secure life, liberty, and estate become 
primary in Locke's philosophy.33 
The principal structure of Locke's argument in the Second 
Treatise runs roughly as follows: civil government begins with 
a contract, and this contract puts an end to the existing pre-
political state known as the state of nature. For Locke, 
[t]he state of nature has a law of nature to govern it which 
obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches 
all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal 
and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the work-
manship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker ... 
and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one 
unreasonable searches; therefore, evidence improperly obtained is excluded from trial. 
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) ("[T]he [rights to] freedom from uncon-
scionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon coerced 
confessions . . . [dictate] that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evi-
dence.") (citations omitted); FED. R. Evm. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice .... ");see also DAMASKA, supra note 21, at 105 ("(S]o seriously is autonomy 
taken in the reactive state that it is protected even in those instances where the 
parties' exercise of autonomy seriously strains the optimal functioning of legal 
process designed as a contest."). 
31. The CJRA, while the most prominent, is not the first attempt to mandate 
increased judicial management of the adjudicative process. See infra Part II. Amend-
ments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also have sought to encour-
age greater case management by the judge. See infra text accompanying notes 
128-34. 
32. See JOHN LoCKE, The Second Treatise ofCiuil Government, in Two TREATISES 
OF GoVERNMENT 184 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947). 
33. See EDWARDS. CoRWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 61 (1955) (discussing the impact of Locke's Second Treatise on natural 
law in American constitutional theory). 
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community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such 
subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy 
another, as if we were made for one another's uses as the 
inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.34 
In the state of nature, all people were free and independent. 
The sole restraining force in such a state was one,s own rea-
son, and the use of reason assured that an individual's actions 
always conformed to nature.35 Individuals entered into rela-
tionships with one another, and the state of nature insured 
the peace. Maintaining the peace, however, is dependent upon 
humans acting in accordance with the dictates of reason,36 and 
people are not always rational. As a result, individuals wrong 
each other, thus creating the prospect of war in an otherwise 
peaceful state.37 This prospect of war was one reason why 
people chose to leave the state of nature. 38 
A second distinct reason led individuals to choose to leave 
the state of nature. Even when one chooses to act rationally 
according to the laws of nature, one may not be wholly suc-
cessful in doing so. This is because the state of nature lacks 
"an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by 
common consent to be the standard of right and wrong and the 
common measure to decide all controversies between them. "39 
Since no moral law is implanted in us, the only way for one to 
come to know law in the state of nature is to study it, which 
not all do. A further complication stems from the fact that in 
the state of nature, "every man hath a right to punish the 
offender and be executioner of the law of nature."40 Thus, "[i]n 
the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge 
with authority to determine all differences according to the 
established law; for every one in that state being both judge 
and executioner ... passion and revenge is very apt to carry 
them too far. "41 
For these reasons, individuals made a contract in which they 
agreed to make a new state by relinquishing the power each 
34. LoCKE, supra note 32, at 123. 
35. Id. at 123-24. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 130. 
38. Id. at 131, 184. 
39. Id. at 184. 
40. Id. at 125. 
41. Id. at 184. 
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held in the state of nature and by allowing the state apparatus 
to perform these functions instead.42 After forming this social 
contract, Locke believed that individuals were better off than 
before. While the individual right to punish fellow citizens had 
been relinquished by leaving the state of nature, all other 
rights remained intact, including the naturally derived rights 
to life, liberty, and property. Indeed, the entire purpose of 
creating civil society was to safeguard these natural rights 
more effectively.43 
In Locke's theory, it is significant that upon individuals' 
decision to enter civil society, their natural rights such as life, 
liberty, and property were increased because people were free 
to enjoy them, which they had not been free to do in the state 
of nature. While in the state of nature there may have been 
more theoretical liberty, in actuality, civil society increased 
the amount of net, practical liberty.44 
Because civil society is designed to protect innate rights, the 
preservation of these rights becomes the criteria for judging all 
acts. of government and all laws of the state. The fundamental 
rights of the individual that emanate from the state of nature 
determine the validity of the laws of the civil state; the laws 
of the civil state do not create fundamental rights. 45 
Ultimately for Locke, the civil state is the sum of the indi-
viduals who comprise it. Natural law is a backdrop both to 
describe the origin of individual rights and to assure that 
these rights are elevated to primary status when the civil 
state is organized. Indeed, the main purpose of the state is to 
42. As Locke stated: 
Whenever, therefore, any number of men are so united into one society as to 
quit every one hie executive power of the law of nature and to resign it to the 
public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this is done 
wherever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make 
one people, one body politic, under one supreme government .... And this puts 
men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth ... . 
Id. at 164. 
43. See id. at 186. 
44. See MAURICE CRANSTON, JOHN LoCI<E 210 (1957). Thie point has important 
implications for the CJRA. The CJRA will bring about a decrease in procedural 
autonomy with the hope of bringing about a net gain in substantive liberties. See 
infra Part III. 
45. See HEINRICH A. RoMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 89 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 
1947) (explaining that according to Locke's philosophy an individual's rights exist 
prior to the creation of the State). 
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protect individual self-interests. The state exists for indivi-
dual, not community, concerns. 
3. The Influence of Blackstone-William Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England followed the Lockean 
philosophy that government exists to protect the individual.46 
Blackstone's extension of Locke's natural law philosophy great-
ly influenced the formative era of the American constitution.47 
For Blackstone, as for Locke, protection of individual liberty 
is the animating force for civil government: 
This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting 
as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless 
by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth 
.... Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a 
member of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far 
restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary 
and expedient for the general advantage of the publick.48 
Yet Blackstone differed from Locke in significant and influ-
ential ways. Blackstone rejected the notion that human beings 
had once lived in a state of nature, maintaining instead that 
individuals have always been social beings.49 In addition, 
although he recognized that natural liberty is a right inherent 
at birth, he asserted that upon entering civil society, one is 
required to relinquish it, at least in part, "as the price of so 
valuable a purchase. "5° From this principle, Blackstone arrived 
at an image of the state that differed vastly from Locke's. The 
major differences in Blackstone's theory include: (1) that every 
state must have a supreme, uncontrolled authority; (2) that 
this authority is the "natural inherent right that belongs to 
the sovereignty of a state"; and (3) that all other powers in 
society must conform to the law-making powers of the state. 51 
46. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 124-25 (2d 
ed., 1766). But cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARlES 41 (Charles 
W. Everett ed., 1928) ("In consequence of which ... [Blackstone] has not perplexed 
the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely 
to the fitness and unfitness of things ... but has graciously reduced the rule of 
obedience to this one paternal precept, 'that man should pursue his own happiness'."). 
47. See CORWIN, supra note 33, at 84-88. 
48. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 125. 
49. Id. at 44. 
50. Id. at 125. 
51. Id. at 47-51. 
WINTER 1995] The Civil Justice Reform Act 317 
For Blackstone, the civil state, in contradistinction to Locke's 
theory, is the final source of the law: 
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, 
confirming ... and expounding of laws ... this being the 
place where that absolute, despotic power, which must in 
all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the con-
stitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances 
... are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. ... 
It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impos-
sible. . . . True it is, that what the parliament doth, no 
authority upon earth can undo.52 
4. The Declaration of Independence-The natural law 
theory of individual rights that followed from the philosophies 
of Locke and Blackstone was a dominant intellectual theme 
during the formative era of the American constitution.53 This 
is perhaps best illustrated by the Declaration of Independence, 
in which Thomas Jefferson attempted to speak for the prevail-
ing mind-set of the time. A believer in the Lockean tradition, 
Jefferson wrote that the rights of the people are "derived from 
the laws of nature, and [are] not the gift of their Chief Magis-
trate. "54 Hence, "[i]t is not only vain, but wicked, in a legisla-
tor to frame laws in opposition to the laws of nature."55 
Unlike the final version, Jefferson's draft of the Declaration 
of Independence spoke expressly of the inherent nature of 
individual rights. The draft reads: 
We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with 
[certain inherent and inalienable] rights; that among these 
are life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness: that to secure 
these rights, governments are instituted among men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned; that whenever any form of government becomes 
destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to 
alter or to abolish it, & to institute new government, lay-
ing it's foundation on such principles, & organising it's 
52. Id. at 160-61. 
53. See CORWIN, supra note 33, at 61 (Locke); id. at 84-85 (Blackstone). 
54. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 691 (John P. Foley ed., 1900). 
55. Id. at 486. 
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powers in such form: as to them shall seem most likely to 
effect their safety & happiness.56 
This paragraph is Lockean in the purest sense. Nature pro-
vides individuals with inherent rights; to better assure them-
selves of these natural rights-and for no other reason-people 
form civil governments. It follows that governments exist not 
only to benefit the governed, but exist solely by the decree and 
consent of the governed. The people retain ultimate authority 
to insure the vitality of their individual rights. If the govern-
ment oversteps its bounds in this regard, the people can 
dissolve it. It is upon such a theory that the American adjudi-
cative system was based.57 
C. Two Models of Dispute Resolution 
1. The Adversarial Model and the Passive State-Dispute 
resolution in the United States traditionally has adhered to a 
belief in the primacy of individual autonomy and self-realiza-
tion as espoused by Locke. In accordance with these ideals, the 
state's apparatus for the administration of justice has been de-
signed to provide a framework by which individuals can resolve 
their disputes in a civil manner, without going to war, as they 
would in the state of nature. This allows individuals to main-
tain the maximum autonomy possible in their pursuit of self-
determination. 58 Theoretically, no state values come to the fore 
56. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of The Declaration of Independence, reprinted in 
GARY WILLS, INvENTING AMERICA 374 (1978). 
57. The Supreme Court has at times enunciated a very pure form of the Lockean 
conception of civil justice. For example, a classic Lockean pronouncement appears in 
Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883): 
Id. 
Every member of a political community must necessarily part with some of the 
rights which, as an individual, not affected by his relation to others, he might 
have retained. Such concessions make up the consideration he gives for the 
obligation of the body politic to protect him in life, liberty, and property. 
58. See Chayes, supra note 20, at 1285 ("The traditional conception of adjudication 
... assumed that the major social and economic arrangements would result from the 
activities of autonomous individuals. In such a setting, the courts' . . . primary 
function was the resolution of disputes about the fair implications of individual 
interactions."). 
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in such a system.59 Rather, those state values required to form 
the mechanism needed to administer justice are only "surro-
gate values" they espouse only the interests upon which 
individuals would agree were they so able to contract.60 Under 
such a view, the only legitimate goal of a system of justice is 
to establish a format by which individual members of civil 
society may autonomously regulate their own behavior. 
As an outgrowth of this notion, the civil justice system in 
the United States has traditionally made the litigants-not 
the state or its embodiment, the judge-the dominant 
figures in the legal process.61 For example, individuals 
determine when to invoke the judicial process; they control 
fact-finding; they are involved in setting the pace of the 
process; and they are generally free to waive state-designed 
protective rules.62 Such a system best preserves individual 
autonomy in a number of important aspects.63 Perhaps most 
importantly, it allows the litigants to make their own case 
59. In reality, certain "content-neutral" values, such as the promotion of efficient 
judicial administration, are incorporated into the fabric of the civil justice system in 
the United States. There has been much debate over whether such values, as incorpo-
rated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are in fact content-neutral. See supra 
note 24. 
60. See DAMASKA, supra note 21, at 76 ("Where the state embraces no independent 
value system or policies ... [t]he only legitimate route the lawgiver can take is to try 
to determine how citizens would have agreed to resolve a matter had they anticipated 
it; social expectations must be captured and defined:). 
61. This has been the case throughout the history of Anglo-American civil litiga-
tion. From as early as the twelfth century, parties have assumed primary responsi-
bility for initiating legal proceedings and for defining the issues in .their pleadings. 
See 2 FREDERICK PoWX:K & F'REoERic W. MAm.AND, THE HlsroRY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFoRE 
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 604-05 (1911). 
62. The party-dominated system of adjudication, which is in reality a lawyer-
dominated system, has been subject to criticism. The most common critiques have 
been that a system controlled by the parties provides incentives to distort evidence 
and includes overly complex forms of discovery and trial presentation. See, e.g., 
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80-85 (1950) 
(contrasting the adversarial process with the search for truth in adjudication); 
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 
1032 (1975) (arguing that the adversary system makes finding the truth too low a 
priority). As a result, truth may be sacrificed to preserve other ends. These ends, as 
have been discussed, are precisely those values of autonomy and self-determination 
that we as a society profess to hold dear. The CJRA is designed in part to address 
some of these criticisms ·of party-dominated adjudication. 
63. In the enormously complex and time-consuming realm of civil litigation in 
the United States, individuals often cede to their attorneys significant amounts of 
control over their dispute. Some may question whether under such a system indiv-
idual dignity and autonomy are in fact preserved. See, e.g., Sward, supra note 23, at 
317-18. 
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in court to the fullest extent that they deem appropriate, 
rather than at the direction of the judge.64 
2. The Inquisitorial Model and the Activist State-The 
activist state is identified most frequently with an inquisitor-
ial system of justice. In contrast to the adversarial system, the 
inquisitorial system of justice is notable for two significant 
and related characteristics. First, a hearing judge is the dom-
inant actor in gathering evidence and questioning witnesses. 65 
Second, a judge is the central player in the adjudicatory 
process.66 
Some form of civil law justice is used· throughout most of 
continental Europe.67 A typical civil law proceeding is divided 
into three distinct stages, with a judicial officer dominating 
the latter two stages. 68 In a civil law jurisdiction, just as under 
the common law, the parties control the initial stage of an 
64. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM: A DESCRIPl'ION AND DEFENSE 
44-45 (1984) ("Ultimately, the whole procedure yields results tailored to the litigants' 
needs and in this way reinforces individual rights."); see also Lon L. Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 382-83 (1978). Fuller 
presents an argument that adversary presentation, as opposed to the European 
inquisitorial model, is fundamental to an appropriate adjudicative process. Id. He 
contends that the integrity of this process demands the presence at trial of an 
advocate rather than solely an arbiter. Id. at 382. An arbiter would sacrifice her 
neutrality by the necessity of creating and presenting the case for each litigant. Id. 
Such a process could hardly allow an arbiter to regain neutrality. Id. at 382-83. As 
Fuller noted, "[l]f it is true that a man in his time must play many parts, it is 
scarcely given to him to play them all at once." Id. at 383. 
65. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 111 (1985). Fact-finding may 
proceed over a period of time, as the judge gathers as much information, but no more, 
than he feels is necessary to reach a decision. Parties act in the fact-finding process 
by suggesting witnesses and avenues to explore; however, they neither interrogate 
witnesses, nor, frequently, meet with witnesses in advance. Id. at 115-17; Mirjan 
Dama!ika, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1083, 1088-89 (1975); Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1234-35 (1958). 
66. See MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 36 (describing the civil law judge as 
"operator of a machine designed and built by legislators"). Some commentators argue 
that such a dominant judicial presence is necessary to provide a level playing field 
for parties of inherently unequal strength. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settle-
ment, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). For example, Professor Fiss notes that an activist 
judge "can employ a number of measures to lessen the impact of distributional 
inequalities. He can, for example, supplement the parties' presentations by asking 
questions, calling his own witnesses, and inviting other persons and institutions to 
participate as amici." Id. at 1077. 
67. See Sward, supra note 23, at 301 ("The majority of the world ... uses some 
version of the inquisitorial system that evolved primarily in continental Europe."). 
See generally ENGELMANN ET AL., supra note 22 (discussing the development of civil 
procedure in continental Europe). 
68. MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 111. 
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action by invoking the judicial process when they file plead-
ings. 69 At the second stage a hearing judge views the evidence 
and prepares a written record of the findings. 70 Noticeably 
absent from this evidentiary stage in civil law proceedings is 
a broad-based, party-controlled discovery process. American-
style discovery is virtually unknown in civil law jurisdictions. 71 
In the third stage, the record prepared by the hearing judge is 
transmitted to the judicial decision makers who make a final 
decision based on the written record prepared by the hearing 
judge, counsels' briefs, and oral arguments from counsel.72 
Civil law procedure thus does not recognize a clear delinea-
tion between the preparatory stages of an action and the 
actual trial.73 Furthermore, civil law procedure differs from 
common law procedure in that it speaks of "instruction" and 
"modes of proof' rather than of evidence. 74 This civil law term-
inology reflects the notion that the judicial decision makers 
should merely be informed of the pertinent facts, rather than 
be persuaded by the presentation of evidence, as is the case in 
common law jurisdictions.75 
Professor John Langbein has argued for the comparative 
advantage of the civil law system of civil procedure, using the 
German legal system for illustration.76 Langbein's central 
thesis is that by allowing judges rather than lawyers to 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. See, e.g .• PETER HERZOG, CIVIL PRocEDURE IN FRANCE 233 (1967) (noting that in 
France, discovery of documents by the adverse party is possible only in very limited 
instances). Some critics have argued that placing major constraints on discovery is 
a rational method of dealing with the pretrial discovery explosion in the United 
States. See, e.g., Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 79-81 (argu-
ing that the appropriate solution to the discovery "nightmare" in the United States 
is to follow the lead of civil law countries and abandon discovery). 
72. MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 111-12. 
73. J. A. Jolowicz, The Active Role of the Court in Civil Litigation, in PuBLIC 
INTEREST PARTIES AND THE ACTIVE RoLE OF THE JUDGE IN CJvn. LITIGATION 246 (Mauro 
Cappelletti ed., 1975). 
74. Id. at 247. 
75. Id. at 247-48. 
76. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823 (1985) (arguing that, in comparison to German law, American civil proce-
dure produces a system of litigation that is slow, expensive, and unpredictable). But 
cf. Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More 
Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705 
(1988) (arguing that Langbein's comparison of the American and German systems is 
to9 vague and speculative to be persuasive); Samuel R. Gross, The American Advan-
tage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987) (arguing that the 
inefficiency built into the American system provides certain structural and substan-
tive advantages). 
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investigate facts and question witnesses, many of the most 
troublesome aspects of American civil procedure may be 
avoided. 77 In a German civil case, the judge to whom a case is 
assigned is the coordinator of the adjudication.78 After the 
initial pleadings have been filed, the judge initiates all subse-
quent activity of consequence. 79 The judge familiarizes himself 
with the case and then summons the lawyers to a pretrial 
conference in an effort to resolve the dispute.80 If a resolution 
is not reached, the judge may call witnesses, and the wit-
nesses are questioned primarily by the judge. 81 
The primary objective of such a hearing is to reach expedi-
ently a socially desirable goal, not necessarily to further or 
protect the interests of the particular litigants.82 Accordingly, 
the interests of the parties in a civil suit-whose interests, 
after all, were the impetus for the filing of the complaint-are 
subordinated to greater societal interests. Such a view is 
diametrically opposed to the Lockean view upon which the 
American judicial system was founded, namely that the pur-
pose of the state-in this case the judiciary-is to provide a 
mechanism to vindicate individual rights, and any other 
interests necessarily must be secondary.83 
77. Langbein, supra note 76, at 824. Langbein notes, however, that aside from 
fact-finding, the German system does not differ significantly from the American 
model. Id. at 841-42. In both systems, lawyers remain strong advocates for their 
clients' positions by suggesting legal theories and proposing lines of factual inquiry. 
Id. at 829; cf. Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Super· 
vision in Three "Inquisitorial• Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 
(1977) (noting operational similarities among three continental systems and the 
American system). But cf. John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Ad-Opt the German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 (1990) (arguing that judicially 
dominated fact-finding, the central characteristic of German procedure, could not be 
adopted in the United States without fundamental changes to the essence of 
American civil procedure). 
78. Langbein, supra note 76, at 827-29. 
79. Id. at 827-29, 837, 839. 
80. Id. at 828. 
81. Id. at 827-28. But cf. MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 114-15 (noting that while 
German judges are more active, in most civil law jurisdictions, parties have much 
more control over what issues are deemed relevant, what evidence is introduced, and 
what questions are posed to witnesses). 
82. See Langbein, supra note 76, at 828. "Socially desirable" in this context msy 
be seen as bringing about those values considered desirable to society at large, rather 
than solely advancing the interests of the litigants, who, of course, invoked the 
judicial process so that their needs, rather than society's, would be protected. See, 
e.g., DAMASKA, supra note 21, at 81-82. 
83. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. 
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As discussed more fully below, the American model of justice 
has departed from its Lockean moorings. This new model, 
though still in transition, has begun to a,dopt certain quasi-
inquisitorial features. The most prominent of these character-
istics is the notion of the judge as a case manager, who enters 
the litigation at its inception and oversees the matter through 
its disposition. 84 In this regard, the CJRA has furthered the 
American movement toward a more inquisitorial process. Un-
der the Act, judges are expressly encouraged to meet early and 
often with the parties,85 to explore with the parties the possi-
bilities of settlement,86 to coordinate discovery schedules and 
motion practice with the parties,87 and to set early and firm 
trial dates. 88 
II. PROCEDURAL ACTIVISM PRIOR TO THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 
The passive model of adjudication, which embodies the 
laissez-faire principles of Locke and Blackstone, has been 
largely abandoned in America. 89 It would be misleading to 
claim, however, that the CJRA is responsible for this depar-
ture. Indeed, by the time the Act was signed into law in 1990, 
the concept of case management had been widely accepted both 
as an ad hoc method for meeting the exigencies of particular 
cases90 and as a formal component of the pretrial process, as 
reflected in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.91 
84. For a survey of modem American techniques in pretrial case management, 
see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CEN'mR, MANuAL FOR LmGATION MANAGEMENT AND COST AND DELAY 
REDUCTION 5-37 (1993). 
85. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). 
86. § 4 73(a)(3)(A), (b)(5). 
87. § 473(a)(2). 
88. Id. 
89. See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: 
Case Management, Two Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 266 (1985) ("[T)he cause of justice can no longer be served by 
a laissez-faire judicial model. Our controlled inaction is an affirmative choice, an 
abdication of our responsibility to use our power to assist in restoring the health of 
the system."). 
90. See sources cited supra note 6. 
91. Rule 16 establishes procedures for the pretrial management of the litigation. 
See also Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit of Bench and 
Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 526 (1992) ("Rule 16 contains enormous potential as a device for 
developing creative case management strategies. I believe that Rule 16 is the most 
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As one commentator blithely stated in 1986, "[T]he managerial 
horse is out of the judicial barn."92 
The Act is therefore part of a larger movement toward a 
more procedurally active judiciary. This subsidiary role, how-
ever, does not detract from the Act's significance. Rather, the 
importance of the Act derives from the fact that the legislature 
saw the need to mandate procedural reforms in the context of 
a judicial movement that was already implementing many of 
these same methods.93 Thus, in addition to the national re-
forms it seeks to achieve, the Act is significant, not in spite of 
the pre-existence of the judicial activist movement, but be:.. 
cause of it. 
A. The Rise of Case Management 
As discussed in Part I, the adjudicatory system that was an 
outgrowth of Lockean and Blackstonian philosophy existed 
solely for the resolution of private disputes between private 
individuals regarding the allocation of private rights.94 Many 
developments in twentieth-century America led to the break-
down of this private law model.95 This transformation occurred 
primarily in the latter half of the twentieth century. 96 The most 
important rule of civil procedure for a trial judge, because, along with our inherent 
power, it is the specific repository of the authority of a federal trial judge to manage 
the judicial calendar."). 
92. McGovern, supra note 5, at 440; see also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judg-
ing and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 322 (1986) ("Managerial 
judging has spread rapidly from one judge to another because many trial judges share 
a sense of frustration at the amorphous sprawl oflitigation under the Federal Rules 
and are anxious to try new ways of bringing cases to issue."). 
93. Indeed, it is arguable that all of the managerial techniques necessary for 
managing the litigation process were available to judges before the enactment of the 
CJRA. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Ciuil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal 
Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1397 (1992) ("The 1983 revisions of the 
Federal Rules and the 1985 issuance of the Manual for Complex Litigation Second 
effectively codified virtually all of the managerial judging techniques that courts had 
created."). 
94. See supra Part l.C.1. 
95. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 6, at 770 ("[T]oday's massive volume of litiga-
tion and the skyrocketing costs of attorney's fees and other litigation expenses have, 
by necessity, cast the trial judge in a new role, that of pretrial manager."). 
96. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 494, 512 (1986) ("The nineteen-thirties were ... the era before implied 
private causes of action, before the rise of civil rights litigation, before much federal 
court hospitality towards rights seekers, before intensive litigation against federal 
agencies, before the reformulation of the class action rule, before the 'due process' 
revolution."). 
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notable aspect of this transformation was the rise of public law 
disputes, which often involved actions seeking prospective 
institutional reform, such as desegregation or the improvement 
of state facilities, and which required ongoing, post-trial 
oversight by the judge assigned to the case.97 
The public law model of litigation revolutionized much of the 
accepted structure of legal adjudication. It expanded many of 
the limiting assumptions of traditional civil litigation, includ-
ing the propositions that the courts were to serve only to 
vindicate the private rights of private parties, that lawsuits be 
bipolar, that legal actions retrospectively address acts that 
have been completed in their entirety, that the right violated 
and the remedy requested necessarily be interdependent, and 
that the suit be both party-instituted and party-controlled.98 
The public law model grew out of the creation or expansion 
of federal rights, both statutory and constitutional, which 
sought to effect systemic social change.99 Many judges deter-
mined that the federal courts bore the responsibility to ensure 
that these changes were properly implemented once a violation 
of those rights had been established.100 This responsibility 
entailed active judicial management of the litigation both 
before and after trial. The judge had to become sufficiently 
familiar with the institution in question to determine whether 
a federal violation had occurred, and if there was a violation, 
the judge had to preside over any post-trial proceedings 
brought to enforce compliance with the injunctive remedy 
imposed. 101 
97. See Resnik, supra note 20, at 393 ("Post-trial judicial management is also a 
creature, in part, of a shift ... in the use of lawsuits by diverse groups to assert novel 
legal rights. n). While the discussion here addresses the case management role as being 
wholly judicial, judges are also empowered to designate others, such as a special 
master, to serve in this role. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a), (c) (permitting the court to 
appoint special masters with broad discovery powers). The policy arguments remain 
largely unchanged when a judicial designee assumes the judicial management 
function. 
98. See Chayes, supra note 20, at 1282-84 (comparing traditional concepts of 
litigation with modem features of public law litigation). 
99. See, e.g., Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1221 (1st Cir. 1991) ("At least 
since the time of Brown v. Board of Education, district courts have exercised broad 
powers and enjoyed great latitude in regulating the operations of state institutions, 
ranging from school districts, to hospitals, to prisons, as may be necessary to enforce 
federally assured rights. n) (citation omitted). 
100. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
129, 296-97 & nn. 1, 5 (1990) (discussing the use of the public law consent decree). 
101. See, e.g., Langton, 928 F.2d at 1210-11 (tracing the implementation and 
enforcement ·of a consent decree as applied to conditions at a state prison facility). 
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Professor Abram Chayes, in his seminal article, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, recognized the rise in 
public law litigation and its transform.ative effects on the 
function of the judiciary.102 Chayes called this model "public 
law litigation," and noted that the defining characteristics of 
private civil litigation had become inapplicable in an age when 
civil litigation was aimed increasingly at the vindication of 
public, federal rights. 103 In the public law model, the nature of 
the adjudicative process was fundamentally inverted from the 
traditional framework, and nowhere so much as in the role of 
the neutral, passive decision maker.104 Not only had the nature 
of the litigants gone from fixed and stable to widespread and 
amorphous, but the judge had become the single dominant 
player in organizing and directing the case, as well as in 
fashioning nontraditional and creative remedies. 105 
At the center of these remedies was the consent decree: a 
judicial order prescribing a course of future conduct for the 
institution or system named in the suit.106 The formulation of 
this decree, as well as the oversight needed to ensure compli-
ance with it, required the assigned judge to become both a 
procedural and substantive case manager.107 In Professor 
Chayes's view, such active involvement in the affairs of public 
institutions transformed the federal judge from a passive 
arbiter into a governmental policymaker: 
[A] judicial decree establishing an ongoing affirmative 
regime of conduct is pro tanto a legislative act. . . . [I]n 
actively shaping and monitoring the decree, mediating 
between the parties, developing his own sources of exper-
tise and information, the trial judge has passed beyond 
even the role of legislator and has become a policy planner 
and manager. 108 
102. See Chayes, supra note 20; see also Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation 
and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 64 7 (1988) (discussing the impact of the 
Chayes article). 
103. Chayes, supra note 20, at 1284. 
104. Id. at 1298. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1284. 
107. Id. at 1284, 1300. 
108. Id. at 1302; see also Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1221 (1st Cir. 1991) 
("In public law litigation, courts typically play a proactive role-a role which can have 
nearly endless permutations .... The reliefrequested often involves the restructuring 
of a state or city program, requiring the court to fashion equitable remedies-some-
times unique and often· complicated-in order to secure 'complex legal goals.' ") 
(citations omitted). 
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In addition to the public law movement, other forces also 
caused federal judges to become more active participants in 
the suits brought before them. The introduction of liberal 
discovery rules in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
was one such force. 109 By allowing for broad discovery in an 
otherwise adversarial environment, the Federal Rules sowed 
the seeds for active pretrial case management. Discovery 
disputes ultimately became a ·source of frequent pretrial 
litigation, as parties sought judicial involvement to counter 
perceived abuses by their opponents.110 This judicial partici-
pation in pretrial disputes made courts more amenable to 
involvement with other pretrial matters. According to one 
commentator, "supervision of discovery became a conduit for 
judicial control over all phases of litigation and thus infused 
lawsuits with the continual presence ofthejudge-overseer."111 
This need for pretrial judicial oversight was heightened by 
the significant growth in case filings beginning in the late 
1950s. In the three decades from 1960 to 1990, the number of 
lawsuits filed each year almost tripled, from 90,000 in 1960 to 
more than 250,000 in 1990.112 Moreover, the legal profession 
in America grew apace. From 1977 to 1989, the legal industry 
grew 382 percent. 113 Furthermore, during the 1970s, Congress 
increased the opportunities for indigent plaintiffs to bring suit. 
In 197 4, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation to 
provide legal assistance to indigent people;114 two years later, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Act, 115 which 
109. See Peckham, supra note 89, at 256 (discussing the introduction of discovery 
rules and their effect on the pretrial process); Resnik, supra note 20, at 391-92 
(explaining that the creation of new discovery rights allowed litigants to enlist the 
court's help in obtaining requested materials). 
110. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 89, at 256 ("The pressures and incentives of 
the litigative process overwhelmed the spirit of the new rules, and discovery abuse 
became widespread, particularly in the large cases."). 
111. Resnik, supra note 20, at 379. 
112. PREsmENT's COUNCIL ON COMPETlTIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIl.. JUSTICE RE.FORM 
IN AMERICA 1 (1991)[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS]. Since 
1990, case filings in federal court have continued to grow. According to the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, case filings in 1990 totalled 
264,409, whereas filings in 1994 reached 281,740. COMM. ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING, 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRoPOSED l.oNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURrS 
11, tbl. 3 (Nov. 1994) (citing statistics furnished by the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts). 
113. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 112, at 2. During the 
same period, by contrast, the food industry grew 90.9% while the automotive industry 
grew 40.0%. Id. 
114. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 378, 
378-88 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1988)). 
115. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 
90 Stat_. 2641, 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)). 
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provides for one-way fee .shifting in favor of successful plain-
tiffs who sue under the federal reconstruction-era statutes. 
Additionally, the complexity of many federal cases increased 
during the 1960 to 1990 period, reflecting the prolific expansion 
of federal administrative and statutory rights, both inside and 
outside of the public law model. 116 Many of these cases asserted 
the rights of wide-ranging classes, which were themselves 
made possible by the liberalized procedures of the Federal Rule 
governing class actions.117 
Furthermore, amendments to the Federal Rules gave the 
judge greater authority to facilitate settlement among the 
parties. 118 Such a grant of authority further transformed the 
judge's role from a manager of the litigation to a facilitator of 
the case's resolution. Modifications made in 1983 to Rule 16 
recognized this fact, noting that "it has become commonplace 
to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since it obviously 
eases crowded court dockets and results in savings to the 
litigants and the judicial system, settlement should be facili-
tated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible. "119 
B. Implementing the Case Management Procedures 
Prior to the enactment of the CJRA, the judiciary was 
predominantly responsible for implementing procedures to 
streamline the growing volume of federal cases. In 1969, the 
judiciary took one of the first steps toward a more efficient 
system when most of the district courts in metropolitan areas 
116. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT 
CoURT FOR THE NORl'HERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, FINAL REPoRT 17 (1993) ("In 1962, much 
of the legislation and litigation in the areas of civil rights, Title VII employment 
discrimination, pensions, and prisoner litigation did not exist. Thirty years later, 
these are among the most frequently filed cases in this district. They are often 
among the most time-consuming cases .... n). 
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Resnik, supra note 96, at 522 ("The revision of the 
class action rule has enabled diverse sets of individuals to present themselves as 
groups to the federal courts and has prompted extensive consideration of when 
representative litigation is permissible. n). 
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (permitting the courts in their discretion to order 
pretrial conferences for purposes which include "facilitating the settlement of the 
casen). 
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983); see also Elliott, supra note 
92, at 308 ("[M]anagerialjudging has recently become a set of techniques for inducing 
settlements. n). 
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moved from a master calendar system to an individual assign-
ment program.120 Under the master calendar approach, a 
motion judge or judges would hear pretrial motions in a case 
until it was ready for trial; a different judge would then be 
assigned to conduct the trial. 121 Under the new system, a judge 
was assigned a case from its inception and remained with that 
case until its disposition. 122 The transfer to an individual 
assignment system had two efficiency rationales. First, by 
handling their cases at all stages, judges would become more 
familiar with the cases before them, and would therefore 
handle both pretrial and trial matters more expeditiously.123 
Second, judges would become motivated to move their cases 
more prom~tly because they would be responsible for their own 
caseloads. 1 4 
Judges also began to recognize the importance of establishing 
regular case management procedures. Writing in 1976, Judge 
Alvin Rubin emphasized the need for judges to take firm 
control of the cases assigned to them. 
[P]urely on the basis of twenty-odd years before the bar, 
and eleven years on the trial bench, and without being able 
to cite data and chart or chapter and verse, I suggest that 
there are advantages to judicial assumption ofresponsibili-
ty for case control . . . . Better results are achieved by 
judges who actively engage in case management than by 
those judges who prefer not to meddle with the lawyers. 125 
Many judges began to adopt case management procedures as 
a result of programs held by the Federal Judicial Center, an 
organization created by Congress in 1967 at the recommenda-
tion of the Judicial Conference of the United States.126 The 
Federal Judicial Center provided continuing education to exist-
ing judges, and it also ran seminars for newly appointed judges 
in which the instructors taught the benefits of active case 
management. 127 





125. Rubin, supra note 6, at 138. 
126. See Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 101, 81 Stat. 664, 664-68 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620--629 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
127. See Peckham, supra note 89, at 257-58 (explaining the functions of the Federal 
Judicial Center); Will, supra note 23, at 117 (extolling the benefits of active case man-
agement at a Federal Judicial Center seminar for newly appointed federal trial judges). 
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The most significant of these case management procedures 
was the pretrial status conference. Authorized by Rule 16 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these conferences allow 
the judge to meet with the attorneys for all sides to discuss 
matters relating to trial. 128 Although, prior to its amendment 
in 1983, Rule 16 focused solely on trial issues, courts began to 
use these conferences to address pretrial matters, such as dis· 
covery and motions.129 Indeed, in 1981, Judge Robert Peckham 
noted "the increasingly widespread use of the early status 
conference" and described it as "a device which enables a judge 
to intervene soon after the filing of a case to schedule all the 
activity that will occur before trial. "130 
In 1983, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of 
the pretrial conference under Rule 16. According to the Advi· 
sory Committee on the Rules, the amendments sought to make 
"scheduling and case management an express goal of pretrial 
procedure. "131 This was done by expanding the range of topics 
to be discussed at such conferences to cover all aspects of the 
pretrial phase, including the prospect of settlement.132 The 
amendments emphasized the need for early and firm judicial 
management because studies had shown that cases are re· 
solved more efficiently "when a trial judge intervenes person· 
ally at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case."133 
Like the CJRA, the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 both 
reflected and confirmed the growing movement away from the 
passive model of adjudication. Under the revised Rule 16, 
judges had express license to work with the parties to coordi· 
nate the extent and pace of pretrial activities. According to 
Judge Charles Richey, the new Rule 16 signalled a funda· 
mental departure from the traditional model of adjudication: 
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
129. Peckham, supra note 6, at 771. 
130. Id. 
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983). 
132. See id. ("This subdivision [FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)) expands upon the list of 
things that may be discussed at a pretrial conference that appeared in original Rule 
16. The intention is to encourage better planning and management of litigation. 
Increased judicial control during the pretrial process accelerates the processing and 
termination of cases."). 
133. Id.; see also Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 823 (1988) ("Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to make 
specific what bad probably been intended from the beginning-that the trial judge 
was indeed the ruler, not only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire pretrial 
process."). 
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In terms of theory, the Rule effectively lays to rest the 
historical model of the passive judge-the judge who acts 
only, when compelled, and who refuses to sully himself 
with the administration of a lawsuit-and replaces it with 
a model that is more active, and which is involved with 
every aspect of a lawsuit from start to finish. In my view, 
this change marks a fundamental alteration in what it 
means to be a federal judge.134 
Other commentators voiced similar assessments of Rule 16's 
wide grant of authority.135 Nevertheless, seven years after 
these amendments, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform 
Act, which requires all district courts to examine their pretri-
al procedures to determine whether these methods can be 
made more effective through improved judicial case manage-
ment.136 Absent from the Act is any statement explaining why 
Rule 16 is not adequate to achieve the reduction of cost and 
delay that the Act seeks. The import of the Act, however, is 
clear enough: in the eyes of Congress, the ad hoc procedures 
in place throughout the country are insufficient to redress the 
problems of cost and delay besetting the nation's civil justice 
system as a whole .. 137 
The emergence of these case management principles, as 
embodied in Rule 16, has not met with universal approval.138 
Some argue that such direct, pretrial negotiations undermine 
the traditional notion of judicial accountability. They contend 
that pretrial meetings and settlement conferences can be held 
134. Richey, supra note 6, at 600. 
135. See, e.g., Peckham, supra note 89, at 258 ("The present centerpiece of federal 
judicial case management is a 1983 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 16 was amended to codify and encourage the use of case manage-
ment techniques.") (footnotes omitted); Tobias, supra note 93, at 1397 (noting broad 
powers conferred by 1983 amendments to Rule 16). 
136. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat. 5090 (1990) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 471~73 (Supp. V 1993)). 
137. Cf. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1291-92 (1994) (noting that despite the significant reforms 
proposed by groups such as the American Bar Association, "the rule changes recom-
mended to Congress by the Judicial Conference remained largely ineffectual"); 
Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 845-46 (1994) (discussing the attempted promulgation by the 
Judicial Conference of a "14 Point Program"). 
138. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 424 ("In sum, I am skeptical of claims that 
management increases judicial productivity at reduced costs .... Moreover, manage-
rial proponents have not even considered the effects of judicial management on the 
nature of adjudication."). 
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off the record, out of public view, and that judges have no obli-
gation to explain such actions in reasoned, written opinions.139 
Moreover, such extensive meetings with the parties may lead 
to biases against particular litigants.140 Thus, these critics 
argue, although judges have seized increasingly greater au-
thority, managerial judging has not included a parallel in-
crease of the procedural safeguards necessary to combat 
potential abuses of such authority. 141 
While an evaluation of the merits or demerits of the case 
management approach is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
important to note here that this activist approach, though 
criticized, is now well established in the American civil justice 
system. Part III assesses the CJRA's contribution to the soli-
dification of case management as an essential part of the 
federal judicial function. 
Ill. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 AND THE 
FURTHERANCE OF PROCEDURAL ACTIVISM 
The legislative history of the Civil Justice Reform Act makes 
clear Qongress's intent to bring systemic, procedural reform to 
the nation's civil justice system.142 At the heart of this objective 
is the belief that the reforms that preceded the Act-from 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the use 
of ad hoc management techniques-were not comprehensive 
enough to effect sufficient change throughout the entire sys-
tem. Indeed, the Act was based on the proposition that funda-
139. See, e.g., id. at 378. But see Peckham, supra note 89, at 263 ("Unreported or 
ex parte communications do indeed provide a temptation for abuse and, more impor-
tantly, may create the appearance or suspicion of coerciveness. To alleviate this 
potential abuse, ... all.status and pretrial conferences should be on the record with 
all counsel present."). 
140. But see Bilello v. Abbott Lab., 825 F. Supp. 475, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). In 
Bilello, the defense counsel argued that Judge Weinstein had a biased view of the 
case stemming from his communications with the litigants during settlement 
negotiations in a prior state action. Id. at 4 77. Judge Weinstein summarily dismissed 
this argument, holding: "Without the participation of the judge in the settlement 
process, civil litigants would be adversely affected. Federal and state judges have an 
obligation to cooperate in clearing the dockets of both courts." Id. at 481. 
141. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 380. 
142. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6804 (explaining how expense and delay reduction plans will create a "national 
framework for attacking the cost and delay problem, while implementing that strategy 
through a policy of decentralization"). 
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mental alterations in the administration of civil justice re-
mained necessary in spite of the increased use of managerial 
techniques by judges, given the continuing escalation of cost 
and delay involved in federal litigation. 143 
According to the Act, systemic solutions to the national prob-
lems of cost and delay are sought, not through rigid, national 
mandates, but through individual and unique plans written by 
each district court. 144 Moreover, most district courts are not re-
quired to adopt specific procedures; rather, they are only 
obligated to consider a number of procedures set forth in the 
statute. 145 As discussed more fully below, the purpose of this 
arrangement is to allow each district court to adopt and experi-
ment with a set of procedures that works well under the court's 
particular conditions.146 
Initially, at least, there is no uniformity among the ninety-
four federal judicial districts. One irony of the Act, therefore, 
is that it seeks to bring about systemic, national change 
through nonuniform, local experimentation with a host of 
pretrial techniques. 147 The one consistent mandate of the Act, 
however, is that each district court seek a more efficient 
system through the judges' increased use of case management 
techniques. As the Biden task force stated: "Both lawyers and 
143. Such was the conclusion of a special task force convened at the behest of 
Senator Biden to develop a set of recommendations to alleviate the problems of 
excessive litigation cost and delay: 
To a significant degree ... the reform efforts of years past have been stopgaps 
designed to address narrow problems rather than to effect fundamental changes 
that would dramatically improve the system. The rising costs and delays 
involved in litigation demand now a more far-reaching approach .... 
Although well intentioned, past changes in the [federal] rules failed to 
alleviate the dual problems oflitigation costs and delays. Accordingly, we have 
concluded that reform efforts must look beyond "tinkering changes," . . . and 
must instead search for more systemic solutions. 
TASK FoRCE ON ClvIL JUSTICE REFoRM, BRooKINGS INST., JUSTICE FoR ALL: REDUCING Cogrs 
AND DELAY IN ClvIL LITIGATION 8-9 (1989Xcitation omitted) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL], 
reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 421 app. at 434-35 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. 
144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-472 (Supp. V 1993). 
145. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. V 1993). 
146. See infra Part IIl.A2. 
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 473. But see Biden, supra note 137, at 1294 (noting that after 
the courts' period of experimentation ends in 1997, the CJRA requires the Judicial 
Conference to recommend either that all courts adopt the six principles of litigation 
management set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) or that all adopt an alternative set of 
guidelines specified by the Judicial Conference). 
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judges overwhelmingly favor increasing the role of federal 
judges as active case managers .... "148 
A. Background 
On January 25, 1990, Senator Joseph Biden introduced 
Senate Bill 2027, known as the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990.149 The bill sought to reduce the costs and delay associated 
with federal civil litigation by mandating that every federal 
district court develop and implement an "expense and delay 
reduction plan. "150 These plans were to incorporate certain 
broad principles of litigation management delineated in the 
bill. The central feature of the bill, as well as of the Act that 
followed, was Congress's recognition that the desired reduc-
tions in cost and delay could only be achieved through the 
active management by federal judges of the cases assigned to 
them.151 
148. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at 7, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 433. 
149. See S. REP. No. 416,supranote 7, at3, reprinted in 1990U.S.C.C.A.N at6805. 
150. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. at 6804. The Senate Report stated: 
Id. 
Title I, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, requires that every Federal district 
court develop and implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan. 
Each plan, which will be based on the recommep.dations and assessment of a 
local advisory group convened in each district, will apply certain well-accepted 
principles and guidelines of litigation management. In this way, title I pro-
mulgates a national strategy and national framework for attacking the cost and 
delay problem, while implementing that strategy through a policy of decentral-
ization. 
151. Senator Biden explained that "[e]ach of the principles set forth in the Act 
rests on a common premise: intelligent case management puts limited judicial 
resources to their best use and reduces delay and excessive cost in civil litigation.• 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil 
Justice Reform.Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 1, 5-6 (1992). The President's 
Council on Competitiveness reached the same conclusion in its report on civil justice 
reform. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 112, at 20. 
These conclusions were incorporated into a presidential executive order. Exec. 
Order No. 12, 778, 3 C.F.R. § 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. V 1993). 
This order requires all federal agencies involved in civil litigation to adopt a number 
of reform techniques, including prefiling the notice of a complaint to the disputants 
in an effort to achieve settlement, producing core information prior to formal 
discovery, and using alternative dispute resolution resources where appropriate. Id. 
For a more extensive discussion of this executive order, see Richey, supra note 91, at 
534-35. 
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1. The Louis Harris Study on Procedural Reform of the 
Civil Justice System and the Brookings Report-The bill's 
emphasis on the need for active judicial management was 
based on two studies that examined the state of civil justice in 
America. The first was a survey conducted by Louis Harris and 
Associates (the Harris Survey).152 This study involved extensive 
telephone interviews with over 1000 attorneys and judges 
involved in the federal justice system.153 The majority of the 
survey participants identified discovery abuse as a "major 
cause" of undue cost and delay in federal litigation. 154 Such 
abuses included the tendency by some to over-discover and the 
related strategy of using discovery as an adversarial tool to 
impose additional financial burdens on one's opponent. 155 A 
significant majority of the interviewees agreed that to achieve 
reform of the civil justice system, the role of the judge as an 
active case manager would have to be increased. 156 
152. LoUIS HARRIS & Assoc., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1989), reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 91-184 (1990) [hereinafter HARRIS SURVEY). 
153. Id. at 92. The survey involved interviews with 250 private plaintiffs' lawyers, 
250 private defense lawyers, 100 public interest lawyers, 300 corporate general 
counsel of companies selected from the 5000 largest corporations in America, and 14 7 
federal ·district court judges. Id. 
154. Sixty-two percent of plaintiff and defense counsel, 63% of the public interest 
lawyers, 80% of the corporate counsel, and 71 % of the judges expressed this opinion. 
Id. at 128. 
The identification of discovery abuse as a chief cause of undue cost and delay in 
federal litigation was no.t a novel conclusion. In 1980, Justice Powell, in dissenting 
from the adoption of certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
recognized the devastating effects that discovery abuse was levying upon the system: 
[A)ll too often, discovery practices enable the party with greater financial 
resources to prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent. The mere 
threat of delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospec-
tive litigants. Persons or businesses of comparatively limited means settle unjust 
claims and relinquish just claims simply because they cannot afford to litigate. 
Litigation costs have become intolerable, and they cast a lengthening shadow 
over the basic fairness of our legal system. 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
155. HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 152, at 132. 
156. Id. at 161. This reform proposal was favored by 83% of the plaintiff lawyers, 
80% of the defense lawyers, 89% of the public interest lawyers, 92% of the corporate 
counsel, and 84% of the federal trial judges. Id. For a critique of the methodology of 
the Harris Survey, see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth 
of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1410-15 (1994). In particular, Professor Mullenix takes issue with 
the Harris Survey's declaration of procedural deficiencies in the federal system based 
on nothing more than answers to an opinion poll. Id. at 1413. 
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The Brookings Institute and the Foundation for Change 
formed a task force to conduct the second study (Brookings Re-
port).157 This task force had been assembled at Senator Biden's 
request to recommend ways the civil justice system could be 
reformed. 158 The members of this group met six times between 
September 1988 and June 1989 to formulate a report. 159 The 
final report, entitled Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delay 
in Civil Litigation, provided the basis for the Civil Justice 
Reform bill160 that Senator Biden introduced on January 25, 
1990.161 
The thesis of the report reiterated the findings of the Harris 
Survey that those involved with the civil justice system in 
America are widely dissatisfied with the high cost and slow 
pace of federal litigation: 
The American system of civil justice is tinder attack: from 
clients who believe that their cases take too long to get to 
trial and cost far too much; from federal and state legisla-
tors who hear these complaints from their constituents; 
from judges who must manage the system; and from many 
attorneys themselves who participate in it.162 
The report offered solutions in the form of twelve broad proce-
dural recommendations, 163 four recommendations for expanding 
157. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at vii, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 423. 
The Harris Survey was conducted in connection with the activities of the task force 
and its results were incorporated into the task force's report. Id. at 6. Professor 
Mullenix, however, questions the report's validity because "[t]he analysis and 
recommendation set out in the ... report were supported solely by the Harris survey; 
the report acknowledged no studies or evidence contrary to the task force conclusions. n 
Mullenix, supra note 156, at 1417. 
158. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at vii, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 423. 
The task force included "leading litigators from the plaintiffs' and defense bar, civil 
and women's rights lawyers, attorneys representing consumer and environmental 
organizations, representatives of the insurance industry, general counsels of major 
corporations, former judges and law professors." Id. 
159. Id. 
160. S. 2027, lOlst Cong., 2d Seas. (1990). 
161. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6816. 
162. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at vii, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 423. 
163. Id. at 12-29, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 438-55. These recommendations 
consist largely of management techniques that are set forth in the CJRA. Compare 
id. at 12, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 438 (recommending that courts be statutori-
ly directed to develop and implement a "Civil Justice Reform Plann) with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 471(Supp.V1993) (requiring that United States district courts implement a "civil 
justice expense and delay reduction plan"); compare JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, 
at 14, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 440 (recommending that each district court 
include in its Civil Justice Reform Plan a system of case tracking or differentiated case 
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judicial resources, 164 and a series ofrecommendations for attor-
neys and their clients.166 Like the Harris Survey that preceded 
it, the Brookings Report based many of its recommendations 
on the need for district judges to become more active in the 
litigation process: "[I]t is essential that the courts intervene at 
the earliest possible stage to structure the litigation with a 
view toward minimizing costs and delays. "166 
2. The "Cornerstone" Principles of Civil Justice Reform-
According to the legislative history of the Act, the bill intro-
duced by Senator Biden rested on six "cornerstone" principles 
of civil justice reform, five of which directly assumed increased 
judicial case management.167 These principles called for: 
(1) building reform from the "bottom up"; (2) promulgating 
a national, statutory policy in support of judicial case 
management; (3) imposing greater controls on the discov-
ery process; (4) establishing differentiated case manage-
ment systems; (5) improving motions practice and reducing 
undue delays associated. with decisions on motions; and 
(6) expanding and enhancing the use of alternative dispute 
resolution. 168 
In adopting these principles, Congress articulated a number 
of policy determinations. Most notably, Congress echoed the 
conclusions of both the Harris Survey and the Brookings Re-
port that reform of the present system depended on the active 
case administration of district court judges: "As the number of 
cases has increased and the cases themselves have become 
increasingly complex, judges, court administrators, and other 
civil justice system experts have recognized the importance of 
courts exercising early, active, and continuous control over 
case progress. "169 . 
management) with 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring that each district 
court consider including in its plan a "systematic, differential treatment of civil cases 
that tailors the level of individualized and case specific management"). 
164. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at 30-33, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 
456-59. 
165. Id. at 34-39, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 460-65. 
166. Id. at "24, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 450. The Brookings Report con-
tinues: "We believe the best mechanism for accomplishing this objective is to require 
each district court's [expense and delay reduction) plan to provide for a mandatory 
scheduling conference-presided over by judges and not magistrates-at the outset 
of all but the simplest and. most routine of cases .... " Id. 
167. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6819. 
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Congress determined, however, that such managerial con-
trol by the judiciary should not be mandated generally, but 
rather should be tailored to address the specific circumstanc-
es of each of the ninety-four district courts in the federal 
system.170 Accordingly, while Congress hoped eventually to 
see uniformity in the implementation of the Act's mandates, 
it initially incorporated the recommendation of the Brookings 
task force that every district court should be required to im-
plement its own expense and delay reduction plan after con-
sidering the recommendations of a local advisory group. 171 
This approach, characterized as implementing reform from 
the "bottom up," had the dual benefits of drawing on the 
experience of those who actually practiced before the court in 
question and of "stimulat[ing] a much-needed dialogue be-
tween the bench, the bar, and client communities about 
methods for streamlining litigation practice."172 
As one of the central aspects of litigation reform, Congress 
attempted to streamline discovery. Emphasizing the conclu-
sions of the Harris Survey and the Brookings Report, Congress 
identified discovery abuse as a chief cause of needless cost and 
. delay in the federal courts.173 Congress listed discovery control 
by the judiciary as a necessary goal of civil justice reform in 
its cornerstone principles.174 These principles, in turn, became 
a national directive on December 1, 1990, when President 
Bush signed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.175 
170. See id. at 2, 14-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6804, 6817-19. 
171. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6817. 
172. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 143, at 12, reprinted in Senate Hearings at 438. 
173. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 7, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6823. 
("Discovery abuse is a principal cause of high litigation transaction costs. Indeed, in 
far too many cases, economics-and not the merits-govern discovery decisions."); see 
also id. at 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6825 ("The day is fast approaching-if 
it is not already here-when litigators will not try cases; they will just discover each 
other to death.") (quoting Discovery, LITIG., Fall 1988, at 7). 
174. See supra notes 167--68 and accompanying text. 
175. The bill, as signed into law on December 1, 1990, differed in some material 
respects from the bill as introduced by Senator Biden on January 25, 1990, although 
these differences are not relevant for purposes of this Article. For discussions of the 
bill's legislative evolution, see Mullenix, supra note 18, at 407-24. For a discussion 
on the merit of a legislative solution of litigation management abuse and delays over 
a judicially imposed solution, see Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Summer 1991, at 105, 109-17. 
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B. Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
1. Provisions-The Act begins by setting forth a number 
of "findings," which are closer to statements on policy than 
they are to factual assertions. 176 However amorphous, these 
findings share a common premise and, not surprisingly, they 
come to the same conclusion advanced by the Harris Survey, 
the Brookings Report, and Senator Biden's task force: For civil 
justice reform to occur, district court judges must employ "ef-
fective litigation management" techniques in the adminis-
tration of their dockets. 177 
The Act requires that each district court develop and imple-
ment a "civil justice expense and delay reduction plan."178 As 
stated by the Act, "[t]he purposes of each plan are to facilitate 
deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor 
discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, 
speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."179 Each 
court is instructed to develop a plan after receiving the recom-
mendations of an advisory group.180 The advisory groups are 
required to submit a report to their respective courts after 
examining a number of the court's features, including the 
condition of the criminal and civil dockets, the trends in case 
filings, the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation, 
and the ways in which cost and delay can be reduced.181 Both 
the advisory group report and the subsequent district court 
plan are then reviewed by the chief judges of each district 
court in the circuit and the chief judge of the court of appeals 
for that circuit, as well as by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.182 
The "principles and guidelines oflitigation management and 
cost and delay reduction" set forth in the Act183 focus primarily 
on increased judicial involvement in the administration of 
176. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(3), 104 Stat. 
5089 (1990) ("The solutions to problems of cost and delay must include significant 
contributions by the courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and by the 
Congress and the executive branch."). 
177. § 102(5), 104 Stat. at 5089. 
178. 28 U.S.C. § 471(Supp.V1993). 
179. Id. 
180. 28 u.s.c. § 478. 
181. 28 u.s.c. § 472. 
182. 28 u.s.c. §§ 472(d), 474(b). 
183. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a). 
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pretrial procedure~ from tracking cases according to their com-
plexity, to "early and ongoing control of the pretrial process," 
to encouraging cost-effective discovery, and to the referral of 
appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs.184 
Perhaps the most comprehensive of these case management 
principles is section 473(a)(3), which combines case develop-
ment, discovery control, and settlement consideration in the 
context of complex or "other appropriate" cases.185 
2. Operation-The Act does not require the use of any 
procedure listed in section 473(a)(l}-(6) for eighty-four of the 
ninety-four federal district courts. Rather, each district court 
(except for a designated group of ten), 186 in consultation with 
its appointed advisory group, need only consider whether to 
incorporate these principles into its expense and delay reduc-
tion plan.187 This discretionary approach does not apply, 
184. § 4 73(a)(l)-(6); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the 
Southern District of Texas: Creating and Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan 
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REV. LITIG. 165, 169 (1992) ("[T]he 
almost exclusive emphasis of the Act is on tighter managerial control over pretrial 
proceedings, curbing discovery abuse, and recourse to alternative dispute resolution."). 
185. § 4 73(a)(3). This section provides as a "principle[] and guideline": 
Id. 
(3) for all cases that the court or an individual judicial officer determines are 
complex and any other appropriate cases, careful and deliberate monitoring 
through a discovery-case management conference or a series of such conferences 
at which the presiding judicial ofticer-
(A) explores the parties' receptivity to, and the propriety of, settlement or 
proceeding with the litigation; 
(B) identifies or formulates the principal issues in contention and, in appro-
priate cases, provides for the staged resolution or bifurcation of issues 
for trial consistent with Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil proce-
dure; 
(C) prepares a discovery schedule and plan consistent with any presumptive 
time limits that a district court may set for the completion of discovery 
and with any procedures a district court may develop to-
(i) identify and limit the volume of discovery available to avoid 
unnecessary or unduly burdensome or expensive discovery; and 
(ii) phase discovery into two or more stages; and 
(D) sets, at the earliest practicable time, deadlines for filing motions and 
a time framework for their disposition. 
186. See infra text accompanying notes 188-89. 
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a). Under§ 473(b), each advisory group and district court 
must consider a number of procedural techniques, including requirements that (1) the 
parties submit a joint discovery plan, (2) all requests for extensions of deadlines for 
completion of discovery be signed by the attorney and client; and (3) a representative 
of the parties with authority to bind them be made available by telephone during 
settlement conferences. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b). 
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however, to those ten courts chosen as "Pilot Districts. "188 The 
Act instructed the Judicial Conference to select by December 
31, 1991, ten district courts to participate in a pilot program 
in which the case management principles specified in the Act 
had to be included in each court's expense and delay reduction 
plan.1s9 
Each pilot district had to complete its cost and delay reduc-
tion plan by December 31, 1991.190 The pilot districts' plans 
must remain in effect for a minimum of three years. 191 At the 
end of this three-year period, "an independent organization 
with expertise in the area of Federal court management" will 
compare the cost and delay reduction in pilot districts with 
that of similar districts for which adoption of the Act's man-
agement principles was discretionary.192 The Judicial Confer-
ence shall include this study in a report it must submit by 
December 31, 1996 to the Committees on the Judiciary for the 
House of Representatives and for the Senate. 193 In this report, 
the Judicial Conference must recommend either the expansion 
of the number of districts for which the Act's management 
guidelines are mandatory, or the implementation of alterna-
tive cost reduction programs. 194 
188. Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5089, 5097-98 
(1990), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 471 app. (Supp. V 1993). 
189. § 105(b), 104 Stat. at 5097. -t\t least five of the pilot districts had to encom-
pass metropolitan areas. Id. The Judicial Conference selected the following courts as 
pilot districts: Southern District of California, District of Delaware, Northern District 
of Georgia, Western District of Tennessee, Southern District of New York, Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Western District of Oklahoma, Southern District of Texas, 
District of Utah, and Eastern District of Wisconsin. CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 
1-2. 
190. § 105(b), 104 Stat. at 5097. Reports on the cost and delay reduction plans 
were due by December 31, 1993. § 105(c), 104 Stat. at 5098. 
191. § 105(b)(3), 104 Stat. at 5097. 
192. § 105(c), 104 Stat. at 5098. In May 1992, the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts contracted with the RAND Corporation to conduct this study. 
See CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
193. CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. The Act originally required the Judicial 
Conference to submit its report on December 31, 1995, but this deadline was 
extended by one year to allow for a more comprehensive report. Id. 
194. § 105(c)(2), 104 Stat. at 5098. Also on December 31, 1995, the Judicial 
Conference must report on the Act's "Demonstration Program."§ 104(d), 104 Stat. at 
5097. This program designates five district courts to experiment with various case 
management techniques. The Western District of Michigan and the Northern District 
of Ohio are required to "experiment with systems of differentiated case management," 
and the Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia, and 
the Western District of Missouri are required to "experiment with various methods 
of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation, including alternative dispute resolution." 
§ 104(a), (b), 104 Stat. at 5097. 
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This reporting requirement is part of the Act's long-term 
goal of bringing greater uniformity to the various case man-
agement principles that the district courts formulate in their 
plans. The recommendations of the Judicial Conference's 
report-whether to adopt across-the-board adoption of the 
Act's principles or to impose these or other procedures on some 
or all district courts-will ultimately form the basis of a wider· 
plan regarding the reduction of cost and delay in the federal 
courts.195 According to Senator Biden, this broader program 
will be implemented whether or not the principles delineated 
in the Act prove effective: "Regardless of the Judicial Confer-
ence's determination, proceedings will be initiated under the 
Rules Enabling Act to make permanent a national plan for 
assuring the speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil dis-
putes."196 The eventual standardization of these procedures 
will eliminate, at least in theory, the inefficiencies stemming 
from the present requirement that litigants familiarize them-
selves with different CJRA procedures in each of the ninety-
four federal district courts. 
3. The Judge as Case Manager-As of December 1, 1993, 
all ninety-four of the district courts had implemented their 
expense and delay reduction plans. 197 Of these ninety-four 
plans, eighty-six explicitly require "Early Involvement of [a] 
Judicial Officer."198 The most prominent devices for the asser-
tion of this judicial control are the setting of an early and firm 
trial date, 199 the holding of a case management conference, and 
195. § 105(c)(2)(C), 104 Stat. at 5098. 
196. Biden, supra note 151, at 16. 
197. CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
198. See id. app. I (showing which of the six principles of cost and delay reduction 
embodied in the Act have been adopted by each district court). The CJRA Report 
indicates that 96% of the courts have adopted the principle of controlling the extent 
and time for completion of discovery, 91 % adopted the principle of early and ongoing 
judicial control of pretrial proceedings, and 87% instituted the principle of requiring 
the voluntary exchange of information as part of the discovery process. Id. at 4. 
199. Several plans require that a firm trial date be set at the case management 
conference. Many jurisdictions establish an 18-month limit from the filing of the 
complaint until the date of trial. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
IDAHO, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Mar. 1, 1992) (setting a 
goal that 95% of cases should be tried within 18 month period); U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, CIVJL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION 
PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991) (suggesting that judge should set trial date within 18 
months); U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLoRIDA, CIVJL JUSTICE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 1991) (requiring trial no more than 18 
months after tiling of complaint); U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 18, 1991) (setting 
trial date within 12 to 18 months of complaint, depending on the type of case). 
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the establishment of a case management plan. Most important 
is the case management conference, at which such issues as 
case tracking, discovery schedules, motion practice, and a trial 
date are discussed.200 
In the District of Massachusetts, for example, unless ordered 
otherwise, the parties are required to file a joint statement no 
later than five business days prior to the management confer-
ence. The statement must include (1) a joint discovery plan 
scheduling the time and length of all discovery events, (2) a 
schedule for the filing of motions, and (3) certifications signed 
by each party and its counsel that the party and counsel have 
conferred about establishing a budget for the progress of the 
litigation through trial.201 Irrespective of whether the various 
district plans require the parties to submit a written report 
before the management conference, most of the plans instruct 
the court, after the conference, to set the pace of the litigation 
through the issuance of a management order addressing such 
matters as discovery limits, motion deadlines, the time and 
methods for the identification of experts, and the date of the 
next, or final, pretrial conference. 202 
The discovery parameters set forth in such management 
orders are often dictated by the track to which the court 
assigns the particular case.203 The "tracking" of cases results 
from the Act's identification of differential case management 
Other plans require that a firm trial date be set at the earliest possible point in 
the litigation. See, e.g.' U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, CIVIL 
JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 23, 1991); U.S. DI.STRICT CoURT FOR 
THE EAsTERN AND WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 30, 1991). 
200. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, CIVIL 
JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 30, 1993); U.S. DI.STRICT CoURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 
(Nov. 18, 1991); U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 18, 1991). 
201. US. Dlm'RICT CoURT FOR THE DlmUCT OF MAssAcHusBTrs, Civn. JUSTICE ExPENSE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, Rule 1.02(d) (Nov. 18, 1991), 
202. See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICTCoURTFORTHE SOUTHERNDISTRICTOFNEWYORK, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 12, 1991) ("The Court should adopt 
guidelines for deposition practice, interrogatories, requests for documents and 
discovery of experts."). 
203. See, e.g., US. DI.STRICT CoURT FOR THE MIDDLE DI.STRICT OF PEN"NSYLVANIA, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELA y REDUCTION PLAN (Aug. 19, 1993) (dividing the caseload into 
"fast track," "expedited track," "standard track," and "complex track" litigation); see 
also CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 ("[Thirty-two] district court plane establish 
limits, or suggest that judicial officers place limits, on interrogatories, depositions, 
or both. Typically, these limits ... vary by track and length of discovery; more 
complex cases are given more time for discovery, and litigants are allowed a greater 
number of interrogatories and depositions."). 
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as a principle of cost and delay reduction.204 Through catego-
rizing the cases on its docket, the court becomes involved in 
the litigation at an early stage.205 Thus, for example, under the 
Eastern District of Texas's plan, the judge must place a case 
on one of six tracks, ranging from least complex to most com-
plex, shortly after the case is filed. 206 The first four tracks 
contain specific limitations on the kinds and amount of discov-
ery that can be taken.207 These limitations are not permissive; 
the parties cannot agree to alter these restrictions.208 Rather, 
they must seek modification at the management conference 
with the judge.209 Tracks five and six, however, do not have 
specific discovery limits because the cases assigned to them 
are too complex to be subjected to predetermined schedules.210 
For these types of cases, the judge must take an even more 
active role in shaping discovery, and the judge is instructed by 
the plan to tailor a discovery schedule that fits the particular 
management needs of the case. 211 
The active and central role of the judge in the management 
of the litigation is certainly the common theme in all of the 
district plans. This feature manifests itself in many ways. In 
the District of South Carolina, for example, the court itself 
sends interrogatories to the parties to gather information on 
the law and facts of the case, the witnesses involved, and the 
discovery anticipated by the parties.212 In the Northern Dis-
trict of Indiana, the judge can order the parties to participate 
in a settlement conference when the judge deems such a con-
ference appropriate.213 In the Eastern District of Virginia, the 
court makes explicit in its plan what is otherwise an implicit 
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
205. See CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 ("[Differential case management] brings 
together two trends in case management into one cohesive system: 1) the monitoring 
of case events; and 2) the supervision of time periods between case events through 
case processing 'tracks,' keyed to serve broad case types."). 
206. US. DISTRlCT CoURT FOR THE EAs'I'ERN DISTRICT OF TExAs, CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENsE 






212. US. DlBm.ICT CoURI' FOR THE DlBm.ICT OF SOUIH CAlloLINA, CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENsE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 29, 1993). 
213. U.S. DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA, CIVIL JUSTICE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991). 
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tenet of the entire CJRA-that the court is to control the 
litigation, not the lawyers: 
[T]he hallmark of this particular court is that its judges 
control and manage the litigation process. From the pre-
liminary involvement in setting a discovery schedule ... 
to the absolute control over deadlines and the trial date[,] 
the court makes it clear to attorneys and litigants alike 
that the court, and not the lawyers control the docket. 214 
By allowing the judicial officer to control the litigation pro-
cess, rather than simply the trial itself, the Act incorporates 
values more typically associated with the civil law procedural 
tradition, as opposed to the common law tradition.215 In the 
face of this early and ongoing judicial supervision of the liti-
gation, the delineation between trial, traditionally controlled 
by the judge, and pretrial, historically controlled by the parties, 
begins to break down. Professor Judith Resnik has argued that 
this early and active involvement in the litigation can affect 
the judge's impartiality: "[A]s pretrial case managers, judges 
operate in the freewheeling arena of informal dispute resolu-
tion. Having supervised case preparation and pressed for 
settlement, judges can hardly be considered untainted if they 
are ultimately asked to find the facts and adjudicate the merits 
of a dispute."216 
Unlike the civil law tradition, the judicial officer in charge 
of pretrial matters in the federal courts is also the officer 
before whom the trial takes place.217 A central assumption 
of the Act, therefore, is that judges must be trusted to 
remain impartial, despite their more active role in the pro-
cessing of the litigation. 218 The question remains whether 
the Act-with its emphasis on case management and de-
214. us. Dlsnucr OoURI' FOR 1HE EAsn:RN Dlsnucr OF VIRGINIA, CML JusnCE ExPENsE 
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991). 
215. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text. 
216. Resnik, supra note 20, at 429-30 (footnotes omitted). 
217. In the civil law procedural tradition, however, the judicial officer who handles 
the pretrial discovery stages of the case does not preside over the dispute at trial. See 
MERRYMAN, supra note 65, at 11-12; Jolowicz, supra note 73, at 247. 
218. Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham stated, in response to Professor Resnick's 
concerns: "Impartiality is a capacity of mind-a learned ability to recognize and 
compartmentalize the reievant from the irrelevant and to detach one's emotional from 
one's rational faculties. Only because we trust judges to be able to satisfy these 
obligations do we permit them to exercise such power and oversight. n Peckham, supra 
note 89, at 262. 
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emphasis of litigant autonomy-will effectuate a better 
system of justice than the one it seeks to reform. 
C. The Civil Justice Reform Act and the 
Lockean Tradition 
There are numerous criteria by which a legislative act may 
be evaluated. Its success may be determined, for example, 
based on whether the act achieved its goals, whether it did so 
in a cost-effective manner, and whether the act sacrificed any 
important values in achieving those goals. As this Article has 
shown, the CJRA represents a further stage in a significant 
movement away from the values that formed the historical and 
philosophical basis of Anglo-American law. Whether the Act 
ultimately achieves its goals remains to be seen. However, the 
changes necessary to achieve the Act's goals, attainable or not, 
are already emerging. 
At this early stage of the Act's implementation, the single 
most discernible consequence of the Act is the transformation 
of the judge's pretrial role, from that of an overseer to that of 
a case manager. The judge has become the animating force in 
the civil litigation process. This transformation of the judge's 
role was deemed necessary by Congress in light of the growing 
demands placed on the system. 219 As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
observed: 
[T]ime and again the nation has looked to the federal 
courts to handle a larger and larger proportion of society's 
problems. One can certainly doubt the wisdom of this trend, 
and particularly of some of its specific examples, but that 
is not the point. The point is that as a result of people 
219. Cf. Wil..LIAM W. SCHwARZER & ALAN HmscH, THE El.EMENm OF CAsE MANAGEMENT 
1 (1991). Schwarzer and Hirsch posit: 
Id. 
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describes the goal of the judicial 
system: 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.' If judges are to achieve this goal in the face of scarce judicial resources 
and the rising cost of litigation, they must manage the litigation process. 
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looking to the federal courts those courts have become over-
burdened and the system has become clogged. 220 
The CJRA was a congressional attempt to reform the civil 
justice system, not by enlarging it or by reducing the work that 
it had to do, but by making it more efficient. This efficiency is 
achieved through a transformation of the federal judge: what 
once was a passive, reactive umpire must now become an 
assertive, proactive manager. In the eyes of Congress, this 
transformation represented the best chance of keeping the 
federal courts accessible to all who sought their use. 
The success of the CJRA must ultimately be judged, howev-
er, not merely on whether it increases the efficiency of the 
federal adjudicative process, but also on whether by doing so 
it increases the net freedom, autonomy, and liberty of indi-
vidual litigants. One way to make this determination is to 
ascertain whether individuals would agree to the costs that 
the Act exacts in order to reap the anticipated benefits to the 
adjudicatory system. The CJRA, much like the move away 
from the state of nature in Locke's philosophy,221 represents a 
significant philosophical compromise undertaken to achieve an 
otherwise seemingly elusive goal. For Locke, it was a wholly 
rational, though difficult, decision for humanity to leave the 
state of nature, for while the prospect of unlimited freedom 
existed in the state of nature, logistical difficulties resulted in 
a tremendous diminution of these freedoms. 222 By forfeiting 
some theoretical liberty and autonomy in order to enter civil 
society, individuals were able to capture a larger share of 
actual autonomy than was possible in the state of nature; that 
is, while the absolute freedoms available to individuals dimin-
ished in civil society, there was a net gain of freedoms actually 
enjoyed. 223 
Although Congress perhaps never so intended, the CJRA 
marks a similar transition. By increasingly empowering the 
judge at the expense of the litigants, the Act represents a clear 
diminution in the absolute autonomy of individuals who in-
voke the civil justice system, an autonomy that we as a society 
have long cherished. Underlying this transformation, however, 
is the notion that because of the expense and delay claimed to 
220. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 3. 
221. See supra Part I.B.2. 
222. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 42-44 and acc~mpanying text. 
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beset the federal adjudicatory system, individuals have not 
been able to capture the sort of gains in autonomy and liberty 
that the system was designed to safeguard. The Act presup-
poses that, much like the decision to leave the state of nature, 
it is rational for a litigant to forfeit, up-front, some individual 
autonomy to reap a net gain in substantive liberty, namely 
access to a more meaningful federal civil adjudicative process. 
The direct costs of the CJRA, in addition to the philosophical 
compromises, are real. For example, the Act adds a level of 
complexity to the practice offederal civil litigation by requiring 
each district court to implement its own cost and delay reduc-
tion plan. The lack of uniformity among the districts' plans 
places an additional burden upon the litigant or, more accu-
rately, its counsel, who must learn the district's local rules, the 
applicable standing orders of the assigned judge, and also the 
particularities of the local expense and delay reduction plan. 224 
For the CJRA to be justifiable, individuals would have had to 
agree to these costs in the hope of reaping greater benefit from 
the adjudicatory system. Whether this would occur is dependent 
upon, among other factors, how successful the Act proves to be 
in bringing about meaningful gains in the process of federal 
civil adjudication. 
It is premature, at this stage, to evaluate the success of the 
Act. How effectively it brings about a net gain of fundamen-
tal freedoms remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Act repre-
sents a bold move by Congress-surely far bolder than it 
realized-away from certain, primary concepts of the role of 
the judge in the Anglo-American system of justice. The Civil 
224.. One commentator argues that the requirements imposed on litigants and 
courts by the Act reduces the quality of justice that the courts are able to provide. See 
Tobias, supra note 93, at 1426-27. Tobias notes: 
Growing balkanization adversely affects the civil justice system. For example, 
the earlier procedural developments, such as managerial judging, as elaborated 
by the CJRA's implementation, require that attorneys and parties prepare, file, 
and sign a greater number of papers and attend more conferences, multiply the 
steps in lawsuits, and enhance the emphasis on ADR. Most importantly, these 
considerations make it more difficult to ascertain the truth and to reach the 
merits of disputes, diminishing the quality of justice secured. 
Id. at 1426. 
Not surprisingly, the Judicial Conference's December 1994 report suggests that the 
Act is achieving more favorable results. See CJRA REPORT, supra note 6, at 27 ("Al-
though empirical findings are not yet available, anecdotal reports, as well as a number 
of the advisory group reports and court plans, indicate that the Act has had a 
beneficial impact on the federal courts."). 
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Justice Reform Act stands as more than just an alteration to 
the mechanism of adjudication in the United States. It is a 
statement by Congress that it is necessary to deviate from 
certain time-honored values in order for civil litigants to have 
more meaningful access to the federal adjudicatory system in 
the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The Civil Justice Reform Act has pushed the state's role in 
the administration of civil justice in this country increasingly 
toward an activist position. This has resulted in the further 
distancing of our judicial process from the Lockean and 
Blackstonian conception that individual rights and individual 
autonomy lead to, and are a justification for, the formation of 
the state, and has suggested a move toward the opposite view 
that the state empowers individuals with these rights. Such a 
move, while deemed necessary by both the legislature and 
the judiciary, further attenuates our system of government 
from that envisioned by the Founders during our nation's 
formative era. Whether such a step is necessary in order to 
achieve a more efficient, responsive, and effective judiciary 
should become clearer in the years to come. 

